THE WAR IS REORGANISED
THE YEARS OF DETERMINATION AND RESISTANCE
The operations and arrest increased day by day and the movement kept loosing strength. The junta succeeded, already during the first six months, to deliver serious blows to all the organisations, including ours. Moral fell to a all time low and panic was caused. Our resistance and armed struggle against the junta during the first six months caused a lot of sympathy among the Turkish people and those who were left behind by their organisations which left the country under the pretext of a “withdrawal tactic”. A lot of people from several political groups joint our movement because they wanted to fight. However, we lacked the possibilities and the organisation to send them into the struggle, to organise them.
And at the beginning of November 1981, all of the 2nd. Central Committee members, except for the political responsible person who was abroad, were arrested. The political responsible person of the 2nd. CC was comrade Niyazi. And when he was arrested as well, in November 1981, the movement entered a new crisis. The strength to fight had fallen considerably. The leadership of the movement was in the hands of comrades in lower positions. There was a gap within the movement, even though it did not look that way from the outside. Several people, who could no longer be held under direct control and who believed the movement’s authority was in their hands, hastily began to gather the separated contacts and instead of continuing the struggle, they began to agitate, based on their own personal fears. After the demoralisation, present anyhow because of the junta, which befell our potential and our cadres, they helped the junta in increasing its psychological superiority and spreading fear because of their indecisive and fearful conduct, not trusting the leaders of the organisation. The continuous efforts by some comrades were not sufficient to overcome this situation. Pasa Güven, on the other hand, who was sent abroad to intervene in some difficulties, completely forgot his original mission and he lost himself in the quagmire of the existence of a refugee, drifting away in the direction of treason.
Hundreds of our cadres and sympathisers were in prison.
The possibility to intervene in events from within the prisons was difficult, or even absent, seen the repression which was applied inside the prisons. Despite the efforts of comrade Haydar Basbag and another group of comrades to continue the existence as an organisation and to confront the junta on the armed level as well by starting actions on a lower level, we were far off reaching our goal. But the determination was kept to stay inside the country, to continue the resistance, and the junta received an unexpected answer on 15 March, 1982, during the main trial. The campaign which was launched from the outside, “The Junta can not condemn the revolutionaries”, was heard even inside the State of Emergency Courts. It was a time of a major silence, no movement, and the junta claimed it had “intimidated the revolutionaries and the masses”. Its rule was stabilised in all areas. In defending our organisation in the courts and condemning the junta during a time in which our sympathisers and cadres were surrounded by the junta, we showed the people in Turkey that the revolutionary struggle would be continued, that this would not change because we were imprisoned by the junta, that they could not make us renounce our beliefs. Our slogans, presented once again to the democratic public and the people and all of the left gave them a tremendous moral support. The leaders and the cadres of almost all the organisations, except for those who had fled the country, were in prison. The junta had learned from events in the rest of the world. They knew they could only temporarily stop the struggle by means of arrests and death sentences. And because they knew that a much more dangerous, a more revolutionary struggle, could emerge in the end, they started a major propaganda war against the detained revolutionaries by claiming that especially the leading cadres had surrendered to the existing order, that they were repenting. Now they wanted to intimidate the people, force them into submission, by means of psychological warfare because repression and terror had failed. We had to cross this game. Even though we were imprisoned, we had to resist, not only to save personal pride, we had to find forms of resistance and ways to inform the people about our resistance. We had to make public that we would keep our thoughts about the revolution alive despite everything and that fascism would never defeat us. We had to avoid ways and a conduct which would enable the junta to present the revolutionaries in a wrong light, at the end of their strength. The resistance had to become more as the resistance of just a few revolutionaries. The prisons, filled with thousands and thousands of revolutionaries and patriots had to become strongholds of resistance, showing the junta that they could never be forced into submission. By informing the people’s masses about our resistance, we had to create a new euphoria and a new morale, starting again with our organisation. A movement which doesn’t resist will drift to the right because it looses all its moral views and ideals and it will return to the existing order. That’s predictable. But primarily, although we were in prison, although we had witnessed many defeats, we had to keep our faith, we had to take care of our wounds and get on our feet again to lead the struggle which was waged by the people’s masses. To achieve this, we had to wage a determined and resolved resistance. To neutralise the psychological superiority of the junta, to maintain our existence as an organisation and in order to prevent that our people would be influenced by right-wing, reformist and obscure imperialist theories in these conditions of defeat, we had to erect high walls around ourselves, we had to motivate our people for the struggle, we had to train them but the obvious and impressive effects would only be seen years later by them. In this way, our struggle was to build a stable bridge between us and the people, carrying us into the future. Those who were unable to see the future, who didn’t believe in it, refrained from building this bridge and they were unable to prevent their own end.
A party can have its leadership, all its fighters and cadres imprisoned, it can witness major defeats.
These are the tests for the revolutionaries. Those who pass their test successfully will have no difficulties to build a bond with their people. We had to change the dock of fascism into a witness stand from which we would exclaim our truth, the revolution, and from which we would condemn fascism. We wrote the brightest pages of our organisation’s history with our resistance in jail, with the docks we used as witness stands of the revolution, with the way were dealt with the problems in the police stations, the way we stood above them, the way we organised a practice which supported people to stand on their feet again, becoming an example for all the prisoners. The biggest effort and work in writing those pages was done by Abdullah Meral, Haydar Basbag and Hasan Telci who didn’t hesitate to sacrifice their lives for their organisation. I commemorate them with great confidence, respect and love.
And when comrade Haydar Basbag was arrested in the summer of 1982 as well, we were completely in the dark about the general state of the movement and who was taking care of the leadership. After a comrade managed to escape from prison in that time and he took over the responsibility, the contacts were restored again.
Now it was attempted to deal with the state of affairs of the movement from inside the prisons, with help from the outside. The decision was made that our movement still possessed a considerable potential and that the line of resistance could be continued with a suitable way of organising. During that period, the cadres discussed the state of the movement and the made a general analyses of how to bridge this period in the best way possible. The movement was not able in that time to realise a stable tactic of retreat. Retreat is a tactic which can only be realised by an organised force. We did not possess this kind of organisation. By December 1982, the Americanist fascist junta succeeded to install its institutions through the entire country, eliminating almost all revolutionary, patriotic organisations – especially the armed ones – which constituted a kind of opposition. Trade unions were banned, intellectuals and many others were arrested or silenced. And the junta wanted to extend its power base by making the people -forced to remain silent with violence – vote for a constitution which would legalise overt fascism. Now there was no opposition movement left which could pose a hindrance to this junta program, this could be realised. The plebiscite for the constitution was an important step in this direction. Among the left, people generally favoured the view to say no to the constitution, to boycott the elections, or to make the vote invalid. But the left didn’t have the strength to realise this. While our movement was in a phase of rebuilding, we had to take a stand about the serious item of making the people sensitive about the plebiscite. Therefore we started a campaign, in the country and abroad, on the basis of “No to the fascist constitution”. We tried to politicise the masses by propaganda and proclaimed that a vote against the constitution was a vote against fascism. Although we were unable to carry out actions in the country on a higher level, propaganda was made in several ways. The action which put its mark on the campaign and which roused the most attention among the people’s masses and world public opinion was the occupation of the general consulate in Cologne and the hostage taking of its employees. We had to apply regular pressure on our people abroad, force them, before something movement and this action could be realised. Every reason, every hindrance to abort the action was removed. Weapons, necessary for the action, were sent from Turkey. Although this action was carried out abroad, it showed it was possible to carry our movement’s policy to our people under all circumstances. It showed one can expose fascism, if the conditions require it, abroad as well when the necessary measures are taken. In this field it has the characteristic of showing a different perspective of militancy and determination. How strong the attacks by imperialism against us may have been, they didn’t succeed in reducing the effect and the importance of this action.
The protests against the fascist constitution and our efforts to call the people’s masses to say no to the constitution were continued also in prison and in court. Our view about the constitution was expressed in the docks of the oligarchy and proclaimed to the people, carried to the outside.
At that time, the prisons had given themselves an important mission. Opportunism, neglecting the facts that we were imprisoned and the developments in the country and he special situation our movement was in, and they acted solely on the basis of there personal worries. They tried to get such nonsense on the agenda like “the prisons are not the central organ, it’s impossible to make policy from there which would influence people on the outside”. These statements were of no use to the struggle, they just were evidence of an attitude which was caused by fascism, portraying the imprisonment of the revolutionaries as an imprisonment of normal criminals.
The prisoners of our movement showed an honourable attitude during the developments in our country, according to their possibilities. They tried to bring the policy of our organisation to the people and they tried to influence and steer our organisation on the outside. This attitude was internalised so much that positions were taken – even about international affairs – under extreme difficult circumstances. We can say that the first and only comprehensive evaluation of the occupation of the Lebanon by Israel was ours, we were the first in the world to determine a position, despite the severe punishment. It were our prisoner’s voices, in front of the fascist judges, who condemned American imperialism and Israel, who expressed their solidarity with the Palestinian people and who stated that the fascist junta was a collaborator in these massacres and attacks. These positions in world affairs, this resistance and the idea to be able to maintain a living bond with the people, destroyed the plans of the junta. Their aim was: “Take them in prison, silence them, make them fear so much they won’t dare to show themselves anymore, force them to adjust to the system”. A prisonership like that of the members of Devrimci Sol doesn’t occur much in the world, it’s not a normal prisonership, neither does it allow itself to be forced in a status of prisoners of war. The prisoners of Devrimci Sol do not bend, they do not remain silent, it’s a new form of prisonership. We could say the prisoners of Devrimci Sol are “Free Prisoners”. The attitude and the resistance of the Devrimci Sol prisoners influenced a large spectrum of the left in a short time, reaching to the democratic intellectuals. Although many tried to copy it, they did not succeed. This is an aspect of our history which deserves much more attention.
Under the circumstances in prison we went through a phase in which we did not have the possibilities yet to talk and discuss with our comrades. That’s why we thought of evaluating the conditions in our country in a more suitable time, with the participation of more cadres. But our comrades on the outside, confronted with many questions, forced us to evaluate in order to prevent a wrong position. It was presented as “Evaluation 1983” to the comrades, discussed and finished. Of course it showed many shortcomings.
The state the left and Kurdish nationalism was in, became shockingly apparent, some written and oral drivel left aside, during the constitution plebiscite in 1982. They didn’t even have the slightest form of organisation and strength. Dozens of organisations had gone to Europe, taking a form which forced upon them. Misleading the people’s masses and their supporters with the propaganda slogan “Fighting against fascism”, they tried to collect money for ammunition and one manifestation was organised after the other. Months and years passed by. Looking at its appearance, the entire left, and even the nationalistic PKK, seemed reasonable and matured. But when they were hit by the sledge hammer of fascism, they suddenly changed. Arrogant, displeased with everybody, looking at everybody as an hindrance for the struggle and therefore as an enemy which had to be destroyed, labelling all as “three to five morally inferior people”, as servants of the exploiter-Kemalists, even as contra-guerrilla, the PKK theorised about the liquidation of the others, agreeing with DY. This organisation, responsible for the death of dozens of revolutionaries, started its front activities, without having gone once through any kind of serious self-criticism, with the words “The people’s masses in Turkey and Kurdistan can not be organised by any left structure”. Separated from the reality in the country, fleeing the country with the cadres in panic after total defeat, they were not able to build a front against fascism in the country itself, nor building a unity of strength and action with certain principles and rules abroad. What did the situation look like? The left didn’t see the real meaning of fascism and the revolutionary struggle, they had not overcome the positions of the petite-bourgeois opposition. Their leadership did not posses a consciousness, no will to power. The left was confused and shocked, their organisation only consisted of political refugees, but still they acted like head teachers.
The left had lost its psychological supremacy because of the Americanist fascist junta, its dynamics were dwindling. Separated more and more from the home soil because of their refugee existence, they increasingly lost the positive characteristics they possessed at least in part previously. Step by step, they decayed, influenced by the European ideology of the “civic society”, of Trotzkists and anarchist tendencies, they started to label themselves as democratic, propagating this line. That’s why they are responsible for the loss of hundreds of cadres who still wanted to fight for the revolution, be it on a wrong line or a just one, they bear responsibility for the dissolution of the organisations.
Those who didn’t fulfil their mission of leaders in the struggle against fascism, perfected the theory of the escape from war. They caused thousands of revolutionaries and patriots to conform to the system. The question of “objectively or subjectively” has no meaning anymore with such a result. The important fact is that entire organisations dissolved and thousands of revolutionaries were destroyed. These organisations bear the responsibility for this. Now these people, after harming thousands of people, after giving false hope to the people, act as if nothing ever happened and they only take care of their own benefit, integrating in the system. Now we have to call them by their real name, and that name is treason, treason against the revolution and the people. Sooner or later the people in Turkey will have to demand justice and accountability for this treason.
We have often said that this “sensational” front, built up from abroad, would only be a foreign front, having almost no contact with the country itself. As a result of 12 September, it as just an artificial and temporary occasion. At the end, this front just collapsed without achieving anything. Of course, we were aware this left, convinced of themselves in their petite-bourgeois arrogance, wouldn’t listen to us. However, it was our task to tell the truth, to warn the people in Turkey, the left and our supporters. That’s why we’ve written the brochure “About the Front” in which we made clear our position.
We emphasised that a left which truly intents to fight fascism shouldn’t waste its time with things which can’t be realised and it should stop to mislead the people with false claims and statements. We stated that it was our task to leave the dividing points aside and that we had to agree on a anti-fascist, anti-imperialist program, aimed against the junta, based on the views we shared, and that we had to realise this program in a unity of strength and action. Our calls were condemned to remain unanswered because they did not have such problems as fighting in the country itself.
After long discussions, a program was prepared in which they did not believe themselves, not a single point was realised in practice and then they started to accuse each other, especially DY and the PKK. Not a single sign of the front was left. It was pointless to say: “We proposed this”. Everybody knew what game was being played.
They were so irresponsible, they didn’t even make the effort to explain to the people why they dissolved, why they were unable to realise a program they all agreed on. Life will show where this irresponsibility, this lack of character, will lead these organisations. Of course, we drew the animosity of this left, chained in the bourgeois ideology, upon ourselves when we made their deceiving and lying face public by telling the truth.
We will now shortly address the situation of the PKK which took over the leadership with their front, without a party, later putting a radical left line of struggle into practice. Prior to 12 September, the PKK was in conflict with all the nationalist Kurdish organisations and with all the left groups. There were also conflicts with traitors inside their own organisation. These conflicts had cost them a lot of strength and the suffered a crushing defeat. Thereupon they left the country in panic.
Although the PKK leadership portrays this as an “orderly retreat”, we all know, as they do themselves, that the truth is different. The PKK went through their defeat, witnessed by the left in Turkey in general after 12 September, prior to the coup.
The PKK had lost strength and they brought their leaders abroad. They lost morale because after 12 September, the fascist terror in Kurdistan imprisoned thousands of cadres, sympathisers and plain Kurdish people in concentration camps. The events after the coup also showed that the fleeing of the PKK was no orderly retreat at all. During this phase, the PKK almost everywhere, in the prisons, in Turkey and abroad, witnessed weakness and demoralisation.
Before 12 September, the PKK had physically liquidated the other leftist groups, making a theory out of it. Because of these attacks, the entire left excluded the PKK but they increased their irresponsible behaviour by labelling several organisations as contra-revolutionary.
They did not leave a fighting force behind in the country which would have been able to deliver a blow against fascism. At that time it was the paramount task to prevent the institutionalisation of the 12 September fascism, to defeat fascism. But the PKK did not participate in this struggle.
The PKK, eager to free itself from its subjective situation, gaining new morale, pretended to admit that mistakes had been made in the past to slightly open the door to the left again.
The left was weak and didn’t plan to act at all. They claimed they had always been prepared. That’s how this front emerged, existing in name but not in reality.
When this front emerged, we stated that the PKK, despite their wrong tactics and a wrong line, was a radical movement which was destroying the provocation theories of the revisionists and that they therefore deserved support. We also stated that the real mission of the PKK was radicalism but that this radicalism would be lost when they remained in this pacifist front. After the pacifist front was dissolved, the PKK returned to its course, considered its situation as being a good one, and in August 1984, they made a large leap forward. The PKK likes to portray itself as the only force, after this leap, which resisted the 12 September fascism. This is a deliberate distortion of reality.
By August 1984, the junta had paralysed all the forces of opposition, the constitution of 1982 had been approved in a plebiscite and there had been elections in 1983. The program of the junta to return to democracy was going full steam ahead. Looked at from this perspective, the emerging of the PKK was no tactic which crossed the program of 12 September fascism.
Without doubt, there are more facts which influenced the people’s masses and the left from which lessons can be learnt on several levels to gain a new dynamic.
But all this can not change the truth that the PKK did not fight against the !2 September fascism, that they left the country prior to the coup, that they – like the rest of the left – looked from a distance hoe overt fascism institutionalised itself. The truth is that the PKK, by participating in the opportunistic front, distracted the
DIFFICULT YEARS, SACRIFICE, ALLEGIANCE AND TREASON
In January and February 1983, at a time when the movement had not been rebuilt yet, we were against faced with a large operation. Almost everywhere where we were partly organised, a lot of our comrades, including many leading cadres, were arrested and a lot of our assets and resources fell in enemy hands. This operation made us loose us morale, we lost almost all our fighting strength and we even worried if we were able to continue the organisation with those who remained outside.
The Central Committee member P.G., who was abroad, only took care of his personal worries. More and more he distanced himself from his revolutionary identity and the reality in our country. The operations in our country, the martyrs and the resistance of the prisoners did not interest him anymore. There was no support for the struggle in our country coming from abroad. In stead of contributing economically or morally, the organisation abroad rather became a burden for the organisation in the country.
It was important to gather the remaining contacts and to continue our organisation, although we had lost a lot of our strength. The responsibility had to be handed over the remaining trustworthy comrades, even though they had less experience. This was necessary to gather strength once again and to make a new step forward.
In this phase Sabo took over the responsibility for the movement outside.
Her closest confidant was Gülcan who had shown a generally positive attitude till then. These comrades took the responsibility upon themselves in this time, the hardest for our movement. Almost all contacts had been discovered or unreliable. Almost nothing was left from the money, the weapons, support bases and hierarchy. We mainly had unorganised people, mostly in Istanbul and other cities, who had not been arrested, potential contacts which we did not know well, and there was a rural guerrilla unit which was inactive at that time.
It was a difficult task for our comrades to gather all these contacts, to re-organise and create new possibilities for the movement. Our comrades enthusiastically accepted this task, despite their inexperience and despite the heavy burden this task constituted. They did not doubt they would fulfil this task.
By taking over responsibility on the highest level, Sabo would quickly learn the art of leadership in this process with her sense of responsibility, her trust and awareness. She had to find out to do the right thing, based on her own knowledge, her sense, intelligence and experience, without anybody showing her the way.
Although she was supported from inside the prisons, this support was only limited and not on a regular basis. When she took over responsibility, only few people Sabo had contact with knew her real identity. In this phase of our movement, women in our ranks were not yet able, like they are now, to proof themselves in the struggle. The tendency to look down at women, only using them in secondary tasks, was the view of a male dominated society. When she made contacts and took over leadership, she had to fight this reality and fight for recognition.
It was a time in which there was no money for paying the rent, nor for the bus. By limiting our collective spending in prison, we were able to support her and help her to manage for a while. We asked all the prisoners we could reach in the prisons in Istanbul for addresses of relatives and acquaintances whose apartments could be used, at least for a while, and we passed those on to the outside. This, at least partly and temporarily, prevented our comrades standing on the street. We could give many more examples and report of heroic acts, sacrifice and dramatic events, but that’s not necessary. We mentioned these examples to enable a better understanding of that time.
The difficulties of the revolution, not mentioned in theory and not becoming apparent, were so numerous that it is impossible to explain them with the classic and known theories and schemes. Sometimes it’s even impossible to explain them in simple text. When these particularities of a revolutionary movement are not put into words, are not grasped into notions, but when it is tried to press them into theoretical schemes, this will inevitably lead to a deviation from the revolutionary line.
Sabo proposed a suicide action, in which she was to participate herself, to continue the struggle against the junta on the highest level. But it’s impossible to achieve important results with suicide actions. Most important was to re-group the organisation. That’s why a suicide action was rejected. We will always remember Sabo because of her unselfishness and her loyalty to the movement.
The responsible person abroad, P.G., ignored the order to return to Turkey by denying his task abroad had been finished. While our friends had no money for a place to sleep or the bus, he took money from them, without warning them, and sent it to his wife and family in Turkey. He took his wife, needed in the organisation in Turkey, abroad without asking the comrades. This breach and treason was continued, disregarding all ethical values. This traitor, leading the cadres abroad, took money from our sympathisers by misleading them with stories of a coming fight which never to come. He used the organisation’s money for his own purposes. He was up to his neck in honourless activities of organised crime, using the name of the organisation. P.G. was going to account for his treason and he would have to pay the price. He did not fulfil the tasks which were given to him. In these difficult times for our movement, he did not want to co-operate with our younger and more inexperienced comrades. He made use of the fact that our leading comrades were in prison and he exploited his charisma towards our comrades. He thought he didn’t have to anything, that he could use our movement’s property as he liked. Nobody could stop him. We as prisoners couldn’t act. First we had to create the conditions to learn what was going on abroad. We didn’t know what was going on exactly. Once in a while, the friends got hold of our magazine which was published abroad. Although it appeared under the conditions abroad, its contents were miles apart from the reality in Turkey, it was a primitive piece of paper, published pro forma. We had to gather in Turkey at first. Our friends outside the prison could not solve the problems abroad at short notice. Our young and inexperienced people developed a ripeness in a short time, a ripeness which normally took years. By living and learning in this phase, they started to evade police control.
The junta continued its program of transition to democracy. Nothing was hindering this program. After the junta, albeit with some difficulty, had the constitution of 1982 approved in a plebiscite, it saw no danger in, so to speak in the honeymoon of victory, holding elections in 1983. The atmosphere in which these elections were going to be held, the quality of the existing bourgeois parties, the bans, the impatience of the bourgeois parties which already existed for decades, this all clearly showed the results these elections were going to have. The regime, which could not last in the form of a junta for a long time because of several fundamental internal and external factors, tried to find ways and means for its political and economical aims by cheating the public with elections. Although the elections increased the political sensibility of the masses, it was an action which required a standpoint of the revolutionary organisations. It was attempted to reach the people by making our standpoint clear in court and from inside the prisons, by distributing leaflets, brochures and handbills outside and by applying classic methods. There was no party for the people to vote for, to support. To convince the masses and to expose the fake elections of the junta, we clarified our view: “Do not go to the polling boxes, boycott the elections, there are no parties or persons worth your votes and support”. Of course, this was not an active boycott. But it was a boycott, even if it was a passive one. Our organisation still existed, despite the difficult times. In this phase, we took some people from the guerrilla units in the mountains of Dersim to the city to carry out armed actions there. Some of them committed betrayal and fled. The inertia in the land, the standstill, not fulfilling the tasks against fascism, this all increased the fear. When this fear was added to the increased oppression in the cities, betrayal was inevitable.
In all the phases of difficulty and loosing strength of our movement, provocateurs and traitors emerged who wanted to destroy the movement from within. One of these traitors, emerging at that time and later punished, was Ali Akgün. Before the putsch of 12 September, Ali Akgün was responsible for the Mediterranean area. He was criticised for not implementing the program and the decisions of the movement, for his egoistic notions, for mixing up affairs in his former region, and for abusing movement property. The Mediterranean area was important to us because progress could be expected there. But because of Ali Akgün’s anarchism, his stubbornness and egoistic behaviour, many parts of our program could not be realised there. Prior to 12 September, he was asked to seriously account for his acts. It became obvious that he was not sincere. He was supposed to go directly to his region to report to the committee there. But on the second day of his stay in the region, he attempted – without warning the organisation and after lying to the region committee – to break into a jeweller’s shop. They were all arrested. Because of their guilt, all were demoted to normal sympathisers and their tasks were taken away from them. In 1982, he used the opportunity of a joint escape action of several organisations to escape from the prison in Elazig with two of our comrades. The decision to let Ali Akgün participate in the escape was taken by the concerned organisation because of his severe prison sentence. Although there are other stories, Ali Akgün split from our two friends after the escape because of personal problems and other reasons. He behaved individualistic. The other comrade took over responsibility in the movement. Ali Akgün sent a message to prison, expressing his opposition towards this comrade and asking for the responsibility to be handed over to himself. Remembering of his misbehaviour in the past and his position, we stated that we had made him a normal sympathiser who can’t take on responsibility and that he had to proof himself first. But he, valueing himself very much like some petite-bourgeois do, did not listen to the decision of the movement. He found three or four petty criminals who had no contact with the movement and who needed money. Together they committed theft, robberies and all kind of dirty Mafia crimes. He continued his life as a gangster, not fulfilling a revolutionary task anymore. Comrades on the outside and comrades who were arrested during operations in 1983 stated that Ali Akgün was not arrested during the operations in January 1983 although the police did have the opportunity. While our people were in conflict with the police everywhere at that time, Ali Akgün walked among the policemen freely. With a loose lip, he spread around that he was the real Devrimci Sol and he exposed all the cadres he knew, or suspected of being cadres. He explains the fact that he is not touched by the police by stating that they are afraid of him. Now the hopes of the oligarchy to split our movement are on this traitor. While Ali Akgün walked around, claiming that “we are the real Devrimci Sol”, our comrades on the outside had almost no contact to the traitor P.G. He tries to legitimise his own treason and he starts to co-operate with Ali Akgün. The two agree to split the movement. To realise this plan, Ali Akgün prepares to go abroad. He stays at the house of a sympathiser of the DHB. One day the police shows up and summons the DHB sympathiser to come to the police station. Ali Akgün panics when he sees them and he tries to escape by jumping out of the window, but he is arrested. The gang he has gathered around himself splits from him and they dissolve. The traitor P.G. has played his last card and decides to return to the system. In fact it weren’t just P.G. and Ali Akgün who planned this conspiracy. The real people behind it were the oligarchy and the opportunists. Opportunism can not accept that al its efforts to split the movement have failed once again and it uses all the opportunities to show its animosity. The theatre they play when the traitor Pasa Güven and Ali “the Barbarian” are punished is the result.